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OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Rule 17(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that:
A minor or an incompetent person who does not have
a duly appointed representative may sue by a next
friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court must
appoint a guardian ad litem – or issue another
appropriate order – to protect a minor or incompetent
person who is unrepresented in an action.
(emphasis supplied).
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The Advisory Committee Notes do not elaborate on
the requirement of the emphasized language above and there
is but a paucity of reported decisions interpreting the
provision. Although the language of the Rule makes the
obligation mandatory, see Berrios v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth.,
564 F.3d 130, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2009), there is no suggestion
which factors should trigger the district court’s duty of
inquiry as to whether the individual at issue is incompetent.
As a result, responsibility for Rule 17 appears generally to be
left to the discretion of the district courts.
This consolidated appeal arises from two cases in
which prisoners, proceeding pro se, sought damages from
prison officials. The appeal calls on the court to decide
whether the District Courts erred in failing to sua sponte
inquire whether Powell or Hartmann were incompetent under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(2) or in declining to
appoint counsel or some representative for them.
I.
Kevin Powell, a Pennsylvania state prisoner
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed suit in the
Middle District of Pennsylvania in 2007 pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. John Symons, his treating
physician at SCI-Rockview. Powell asserts an Eighth
Amendment claim that Dr. Symons was deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs. The District Court denied
Dr. Symons’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Dr. Symons subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment.
Powell filed a series of motions for extensions of time
and for counsel. The Magistrate Judge, exercising his
authority to resolve non-dispositive pre-trial motions, granted
five of Powell’s requests for extensions of time to file a
response and denied one request as moot. In the last order
extending Powell’s time to respond, the Magistrate Judge
directed him to respond by February 26, 2010 and informed
Powell that no further extensions would be granted. Powell’s
seventh motion for an extension of time to respond to Dr.
Symons’ motion for summary judgment explained that the
District Court presiding over his criminal proceeding had
4

ordered him to a psychiatric facility for four months and he
was there without his personal property. The Magistrate
Judge denied the motion and reminded Powell that no further
extensions would be granted. Powell never filed a response
to the motion for summary judgment.
Powell’s ten motions for counsel cited his rudimentary
education and his difficulties obtaining legal assistance while
in prison. The Magistrate Judge denied each of Powell’s
motions for counsel. In so doing, the Magistrate Judge wrote
that he assumed Powell’s claim to have potential merit and
that several of the relevant factors, including Powell’s
education level and the need for expert testimony, weighed in
favor of appointing counsel. Although the Magistrate Judge
stated that he preferred to appoint counsel, he denied counsel
primarily on the ground that, in his experience, it is difficult
to find counsel willing to represent prisoners in civil rights
cases.
At about the same time as Powell’s civil proceeding,
he was charged in a criminal proceeding in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania for issuing threats against the
President and mailing threatening communications in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 871 and 876(c), respectively. 1
Powell, who was represented in the criminal case by
appointed counsel, pleaded guilty to those charges in January
2009. However, prior to sentencing, the District Court
appointed a psychiatrist, Dr. Stefan Kruszewski, to examine
Powell and prepare a written report of his findings.
Dr. Kruszewski, a graduate of Harvard Medical
School, has written and spoken extensively about psychiatric
issues. He has had at least 30 years of clinical practice
experience in which he treated several thousand patients with
a wide variety of psychiatric and neuropsychiatric conditions.
He prepared an extensive report for the criminal case, setting
forth details of his examination. Dr. Kruszewski concluded
that Powell met the accepted diagnosis of delusional disorder,
mixed subtypes, a diagnosis based on Powell’s “repeated
pattern of physical complaints without medical findings to
He subsequently explained that he sent those threats so
he would be transferred to federal prison.
1
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support them, the somatic elements of his reported ‘torture’
and his simultaneously persistent and episodic refusal of
medication.” S.A. at 42. The report continued, “[r]egardless
of the cause of his symptoms and the origins of his delusional
disorder, some of his conduct is beyond his willful control.
That is the nature of an isolated psychotic system of relatively
fixed delusional beliefs.” Id.
Dr. Kruszewski wrote that Powell’s “potential to act
out violently against others, including those he named in his
letters, is small,” in part because he has “somewhat limited
cognitive abilities.” S.A. at 42. Dr. Kruszewski further noted
that “there is a great deal of doubt that he had the capacity to
form the criminal intent to harm because he has a persistent
serious mental illness that chronically alters his reality and his
ability to conduct himself within the confines of the law,” and
that “we can expect his delusional symptoms to wax and
wane.” Id. Notwithstanding this diagnosis, Dr. Kruszewski
also found that “[a]lthough his testable fund of information
was limited in certain ways . . . , Mr. Powell was able to
satisfy my concern that he was able to understand the legal
processes and cooperate with them to the best of his ability.”
S.A. at 32.
After reading and absorbing Dr. Kruszewski’s
diagnosis, the District Court acknowledged that Powell “may
be suffering from a mental disease or defect that has rendered
him mentally incompetent to the extent that he was previously
unable to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.” S.A. at
49. However, the Court determined that Dr. Kruszewski’s
report did not provide the Court with sufficient information
regarding Powell’s competency when he pleaded guilty and
ordered that Powell be committed to federal custody for
further psychiatric evaluation.
In October 2009, on the basis of an additional
psychiatric evaluation, the Court granted the motion of
Powell’s defense counsel to withdraw his guilty plea and
enter a plea of not guilty to the charges in the indictment.
The Court then issued an order finding that Powell “is
presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering
him mentally incompetent to understand the nature and the
consequences of the proceedings now against him.” S.A. at
6

52. Subsequently, the U.S. Attorney requested dismissal of
the indictment, which the Court granted in July 2010.
Turning to the civil case, the Magistrate Judge, in his
last two orders denying counsel, noted the criminal court’s
rulings and his own concerns about Powell’s mental
competence. In an order entered August 2009, the Magistrate
Judge concluded that although “[Powell’s] mental capacity
could affect his ability to present his case in a clear and
concise manner, he has thus far been able to preserve his
interests by engaging in communication with the court. As
evident in the documents that [Powell] has already filed with
the court, it is clear that [Powell] is literate and more than
capable of communicating effectively.” J.A. at 22. In a later
order entered in March 2010, the Magistrate Judge
acknowledged that since his last order Powell had been
adjudicated mentally incompetent in the criminal proceeding.
The Magistrate Judge stated that “[t]he fact that [Powell] has
been found incompetent, of course, weighs in favor of
appointing counsel.” J.A. at 27. He once again denied the
motion, however, based on his conclusion that “it is unlikely
that counsel could be found to represent [Powell].” J.A. at
28. The Magistrate Judge did not discuss his obligations
under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The same day, the Magistrate Judge issued a report
and recommendation noting that Powell had not filed a
response to the motion for summary judgment, but he
recommended granting it on the merits because Dr. Symons
“presented evidence that [Powell] received extensive medical
care and treatment including examinations, medications, lab
tests, chest x-rays and an electrocardiogram.” J.A. at 38. The
Magistrate Judge noted that Powell “has not presented any
evidence that [Dr. Symons] was deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs or any evidence that [Dr. Symons’] actions or
inactions caused him harm.” J.A. at 39. The District Court
adopted the recommendation in full. Powell appeals. 2
Because Powell asserts a claim under the Eighth
Amendment and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the District
Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have
jurisdiction over his appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
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We review for abuse of discretion both a district
court’s decision to appoint a guardian ad litem under Rule
17(c) as well as its decision to deny counsel to an indigent
civil litigant. 3 See Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492,
498 (3d Cir. 2002) (appointment of counsel); Gardner ex rel.
Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 1989) (Rule
17(c)). We exercise plenary review of a district court’s grant
We reject Dr. Symons’ argument that, because Powell
cited the wrong order in his Notice of Appeal, this court is
without jurisdiction over Powell’s appeal. Notices of appeal,
especially those filed pro se, are liberally construed, and we
can exercise jurisdiction over orders not specified in a notice
of appeal if “(1) there is a connection between the specified
and unspecified orders; (2) the intention to appeal the
unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party is
not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues.”
Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir.
2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Those
requirements are met here. In his Notice of Appeal, Powell
listed the date of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation rather than the final order of the District
Court. However, those two documents are closely related, as
Dr. Symons concedes. Moreover, Powell’s intent is clearly to
appeal the final order adopting the Report and
Recommendation as this is the only means of obtaining relief
from the summary judgment decision he challenges.
Moreover, Dr. Symons has had a full opportunity to brief all
the issues and has not been prejudiced by Powell’s error.
Powell did not object to the Magistrate Judge’s orders
denying his motions for counsel, as required by Middle
District of Pennsylvania Rule 72.2. “Normally, a party who
fails to object before the district court to a magistrate judge’s
ruling on a non-dispositive pretrial matter waives that
objection on appeal.” Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153-54
n.2 (3d Cir. 1993). However, in light of Powell’s pro se
status and the fact that the Magistrate Judge’s orders did not
notify Powell that he risked waiving his appellate rights by
failing to object, this court has discretion to reach the issue.
See Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 364-65 (3d Cir. 2007);
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153 n.2.
3
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of summary judgment, and apply the same standard as the
district court. See Tri-M Group, LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406,
415 (3d Cir. 2011); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
II.
This court consolidated the appeals filed by Powell
and Detlef Hartmann (whose appeal raises similar issues of
the obligation of district courts under Federal Rule 17(c)) and
appointed amicus counsel to address the following: (1)
whether, in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), the
District Courts should have sua sponte questioned the
competence of Powell and Hartmann; (2) if so, what actions
the Courts should have taken in that regard; and (3) whether
the District Courts abused their discretion in denying the
motions for appointment of counsel. 4
Federal courts encounter the issue of appointment of
counsel more frequently in civil cases under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e), but only rarely consider the issue of appointment of
a guardian ad litem under Rule 17(c).
As noted at the outset of the opinion, it is the federal
district court’s obligation to issue an appropriate order “to
protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented
in an action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2). This court has yet to
set forth the factors that warrant sua sponte inquiry into a
litigant’s capacity to sue or be sued under Rule 17(c) and the
Rule itself does not offer any commentary. However, the
Second Circuit has set forth a well-reasoned standard that has
been adopted elsewhere and that we adopt under the
circumstances here. In Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care
Center, 323 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2003), that Court
concluded that a district court need not inquire sua sponte
into a pro se plaintiff’s mental competence based on a
litigant’s bizarre behavior alone, even if such behavior may
suggest mental incapacity. That is an important limiting
factor as to the application of Rule 17. The federal courts are
We express our appreciation to counsel for amici Karen
Daly and Stephen McConnell and their law firm, Dechert
LLP, for undertaking this responsibility. It is in the best
tradition of the Philadelphia bar.
4
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flooded with pro se litigants with fanciful notions of their
rights and deprivations. We cannot expect district judges to
do any more than undertake a duty of inquiry as to whether
there may be a viable basis to invoke Rule 17. That duty of
inquiry involves a determination of whether there is verifiable
evidence of incompetence. In the context of unrepresented
litigants proceeding in forma pauperis, this inquiry would
usually occur after the preliminary merits screening under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A or 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
With regard to the question of whether there is
verifiable evidence of incompetence, the Ferrelli Court
concluded that a district court would likely abuse its
discretion if it failed to consider whether Rule 17(c) applied
“[i]f a court were presented with evidence from an
appropriate court of record or a relevant public agency
indicating that the party had been adjudicated incompetent, or
if the court received verifiable evidence from a mental health
professional demonstrating that the party is being or has been
treated for mental illness of the type that would render him or
her legally incompetent.” Id. We also agree with the Fourth
Circuit in Hudnall v. Sellner, 800 F.2d 377, 385 (4th Cir.
1986), that bizarre behavior alone is insufficient to trigger a
mandatory inquiry into a litigant’s competency but “if there
has been a legal adjudication of incompetence and that is
brought to the court’s attention, the Rule’s provision is
brought into play.” The Ferrelli Court noted that it was
“mindful of the need to protect the rights of the mentally
incompetent,” but at the same time “in light of the volume of
pro se filings in [the Second] Circuit,” it could not “disregard
the potential burden on court administration associated with
conducting frequent inquiries into pro se litigants’ mental
competency.” 323 F.3d at 201. We share the same concern.
It follows that the district court must satisfy its duty of inquiry
before it proceeds to determine if Rule 17 applies.
A court is not required to conduct a sua sponte
determination whether an unrepresented litigant is
incompetent unless there is some verifiable evidence of
incompetence. However, once the duty of inquiry is satisfied,
a court may not weigh the merits of claims beyond the §
1915A or § 1915(e)(2) screening if applicable. Cf. Berrios v.
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing
10

Gardner, 874 F.2d at 141) (“Because [the plaintiff, a severely
mentally retarded teenager] was without a representative
when the court dismissed her claims, and was otherwise
unprotected, the court was without authority to reach the
merits of those claims.”); cf. also Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v.
Carcieri, 608 F.3d 77, 94 n.15 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing
Adelman ex rel. Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986, 989 (5th
Cir. 1984), for the proposition that “the district court
improperly dismissed the case without first determining
whether the incompetent’s interests were adequately
represented”). 5
A. Kevin Powell

In a not dissimilar context, this court has previously had
occasion to consider the standard for appointment of counsel
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a statute that “gives district courts
broad discretion to request an attorney to represent an
indigent civil litigant.” Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d
Cir. 1993). In Tabron, we held that, after considering the
merits of a plaintiff’s claim as a threshold matter, a district
court should consider additional factors that bear on the need
for appointed counsel including: (1) plaintiff’s ability to
present his case; (2) the difficulty of the legal issues; (3) the
degree to which factual investigation will be necessary and
plaintiff’s ability to pursue investigation; (4) plaintiff’s
capacity to retain counsel on his own behalf; (5) the extent to
which the case will turn on credibility determinations; and (6)
whether the case will require testimony from an expert
witness. Id. at 155-57; Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d
492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002). Powell’s complaint easily met the
threshold issue of the merits of the putative claim because the
District Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss,
acknowledging that Powell’s claim had sufficient merit to
proceed. Nonetheless, the District Court denied Powell’s
request for counsel noting the scarcity of attorneys willing to
take prisoner civil rights cases pro bono. We recognized that
problem in Tabron, but we declined to make that issue
determinative of appointment of counsel, 6 F.3d at 157, and
we decline to do so here as well.
5
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It appears that the District Court in Powell’s case
failed to consider whether Rule 17(c) applied, an issue raised
first by this court rather than by anyone on Powell’s behalf, or
by the defendant. Most important, Powell had been
adjudicated incompetent in the simultaneous criminal
proceeding, and the Magistrate Judge was on notice of that
adjudication. Under Pennsylvania law, the applicable law of
Powell’s domicile, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(1), once a person
is adjudicated incompetent, s/he is deemed incompetent “for
all purposes until, by court order, the status of incompetency
is lifted.” Syno v. Syno, 594 A.2d 307, 310 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (citing 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5517 and Pa. R. Civ.
P. 2051). 6
Under ordinary circumstances, a determination as to
whether Rule 17 applies is to be made in the first instance by
the trial court. Here, however, the psychiatric report is so
thorough as to Powell’s incapacity for purposes of the
criminal case and the Court’s finding of incapacity so amply
supported in the record, that we conclude that it was an abuse
of discretion not to enter an order appointing an appropriate
representative. There is nothing to show that the Magistrate
Judge sought counsel, made inquiry of the bar associations, or
inquired as to whether law schools that may have clinical
programs or senior centers with social workers would be
willing to undertake the necessary representation.
It appears that in Powell’s case it may not be difficult
to undertake this task. Dr. Symons’ brief suggests that there
is ample evidence that Powell’s condition was seriously
considered, but under the test we adopt from Ferrelli, we may
not assume his competence in the face of evidence to the
contrary. Therefore, we will reverse and remand with
directions to the District Court to appoint a representative or
counsel to proceed with the case.
Pennsylvania defines an “incapacitated person” as “an
adult whose ability to receive and evaluate information
effectively and communicate decisions in any way is
impaired to such a significant extent that the person is
partially or totally unable to manage financial resources or to
meet the essential requirements for physical health and
safety.” Pa. R. Civ. P. 2051.
6
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B. Detlef Hartmann
In 2006, while incarcerated at the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center (“Vaughn”), Detlef Hartmann filed a pro
se suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District of Delaware
against the warden and members of the prison medical staff,
among others. 7 Hartmann was granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis.
Hartmann’s initial complaint listed twenty defendants
and made a variety of claims concerning the circumstances of
his incarceration, including the denial of medical services and
inadequate access to legal materials. After screening under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A and a series of amendments to
the complaint, the District Court permitted Hartmann to
proceed with his claims against Ihuoma Chuks, an employee
of Correctional Medical Services, Inc., the contractor
responsible for healthcare at Vaughn; Thomas Carroll, then
warden of Vaughn; and David Pierce, then deputy warden of
Vaughn. Hartmann alleged that Chuks, Carroll, and Pierce
were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
Specifically, Hartmann claimed that he was denied treatment
for throat pain and thyroid disease and that, although he was
referred to an endocrinologist, prison officials never
transported him to one. Hartmann’s other claims and other
named defendants were dismissed for various reasons,
including failure to serve, and are not the subject of this
appeal.
Defendants Carroll and Pierce filed a motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of process, which was denied by the
District Court. Carroll subsequently served a set of
interrogatories on Hartmann. Hartmann’s response to those
interrogatories, while somewhat discursive, demonstrated an
impressive ability to organize his points, make rational
arguments, and cite supporting legal authority.
During the course of this litigation, Hartmann also
filed eight motions seeking appointment of counsel. Those
motions listed a variety of reasons why counsel was
necessary, including Hartmann’s limited access to legal
7

Hartmann was released from custody in January 2009.
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materials and unspecified “mental disabilities.” J.A. at 217,
246. Attached to his final request for counsel, Hartmann filed
a one-paragraph letter from Dr. Jeanette Zaimes, a
psychiatrist, that states:
To Whom It May Concern: Mr. Detlef Hartmann is
under my care for Major Depression and Attention
Deficit Disorder. I do not feel he is competent at this
time to represent himself in court. I would recommend
that he be given a public defender, if at all possible.
J.A. at 389. There is no other medical evidence of
Hartmann’s mental health in the record.
The District Court denied each of Hartmann’s requests
for counsel, repeatedly finding that Hartmann was capable of
presenting his own case. In its order denying Hartmann’s
final request for counsel, the Court acknowledged Dr.
Zaimes’ letter, but found that “[u]pon consideration of the
record, the court is not persuaded that appointment of counsel
is warranted at this time. The court has thoroughly reviewed
the file and, at every turn, [Hartmann] has ably represented
himself. At this juncture of the case, there is no evidence that
prejudice will result in the absence of counsel.” J.A. at 89.
However, the Court denied the motion without prejudice, to
be renewed should any of his claims survive summary
judgment. As in Powell’s case, the District Court did not
explicitly discuss its Rule 17 obligations.
Thereafter, in April 2010, Chuks, Carroll, and Pierce
moved for summary judgment, which the District Court
granted. The Court concluded that the defendants were
entitled to summary judgment because there was insufficient
evidence that “the defendants had any personal involvement
in the alleged constitutional violations.” J.A. at 99. In
addition, the Court found that the record demonstrated that
Hartmann received medical care for his throat and thyroid
conditions and that the evidence could not support a finding
of deliberate indifference. In the same order the District
Court dismissed, without prejudice, Hartmann’s claims

14

against two other defendants for failure to effect service. 8
Hartmann appeals this final order.
Under the rule we adopt in this case, the letter from Dr.
Zaimes sufficed to put the district court on notice that
Hartmann was possibly incompetent. When confronted with
verifiable evidence from a mental health professional of an
unrepresented litigant’s incompetence, the district court has
an obligation, pursuant to Rule 17, to inquire into the
litigant’s competency. But the letter from Dr. Zaimes is
hardly overwhelming evidence of incompetency. It amounts
to little more than a conclusory statement that Hartmann is
incompetent, and it fails to specify what assessments Dr.
Zaimes performed to arrive at that conclusion. It is thus quite
unlike the careful and detailed analysis provided by Dr.
Kruszewski as to Kevin Powell.
Under the circumstances, the evidence of
incompetency is not so strong that we may conclude that the
district court necessarily should have found Hartmann to be
incompetent and should have appointed a guardian or counsel
to represent his interests. Instead, we hold only that the
district court abused its discretion in failing to at least
consider the possible application of Rule 17(c). We are
It is not clear whether Hartmann intends to challenge the
dismissal of his claims against Paul Howard and Edward
Johnson on appeal. However, to the extent that Hartmann
challenges that ruling, we will affirm. The District Court
waited over two years after Hartmann filed his revised
amended complaint before dismissing Hartmann’s claims
against Howard and Johnson for failure to serve. Hartmann
was given an opportunity to state good cause for the delay,
but he failed to do so. Where a plaintiff fails without good
cause to effect service on a defendant within 120 days of the
filing of a complaint, a district court does not abuse its
discretion by dismissing the action against that defendant
without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); Rance v.
Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 1284, 1286-87 (11th
Cir. 2009) (explaining that an incarcerated pro se plaintiff is
entitled to rely on service by the U.S. Marshals, but only after
the plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify the
defendants).
8
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sensitive to the potential burden imposed by such a holding
on the district courts. It might be that some evidence of
incompetence (such as, perhaps, Dr. Zaimes’s letter) is
sufficiently unpersuasive as to be rebutted by other evidence
in the record, or by the district court’s own experience with
an unrepresented litigant, without the need for a full blown
hearing. But there ought to have been at least some
consideration of the Rule under these circumstances. We
shall remand for the district court to determine, in its
discretion, whether Hartmann is competent within the
meaning of Rule 17(c), as well as the degree and form of
process required to answer that question. If he is determined
to be incompetent and remains unrepresented, Rule 17(c)
requires that a guardian be appointed or some other remedial
step taken. 9
III.
The fact that we remand does not suggest that either
District Judge erred in the procedure each followed. Each
Judge was conscientious in his or her review. We had not
previously turned our attention, and therefore theirs, to Rule
17. Only after the issue of the propriety of appointing a
representative on behalf of each of these plaintiffs is

In denying Hartmann’s motions for appointment of
counsel, the District Court stated that appointment of counsel
is warranted “only ‘upon a showing of special circumstances
indicating the likelihood of substantial prejudice to [plaintiff]
resulting from [plaintiff’s] probable inability without such
assistance to present the facts and legal issues to the court in a
complex but arguably meritorious case.’” J.A. at 88-89
(quoting Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.3d 22, 26 (3d Cir.
1984)). We note, however, that in Tabron this court
repudiated the “special circumstances” requirement. See 6
F.3d at 155. In light of that fact we will remand for the
District Court to reconsider the request for counsel in addition
to the Rule 17(c) issue.
9
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considered can we be satisfied that the process required by
Rule 17 has been satisfied. 10

We will respectfully send a copy of this opinion to the
chairperson of the Advisory Committee to call to its attention
the paucity of comments on Rule 17.
10
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